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I.

INTRODUCTION

This is a show-cause proceeding to determine whether the State
should be held in contempt because the 2014 Legislature did not submit
the “complete plan” this Court directed in its January 2014 Order, and, if
so, whether and when any sanction should be imposed. McCleary v. State,
No. 84362-7, Order to Show Cause at 3-4 (June 12, 2014). The Court’s
Order was explicit, specifically limiting the issues to be considered.
Those issues do not include whether the State can demonstrate ultimate
compliance with article IX, section 1 of the Washington Constitution or
whether legislative actions to date evidence sufficient progress toward that
compliance.
The State’s Opening Brief Addressing Order to Show Cause
explained the factual and legal reasons why the State should not be found
in contempt; why no sanction should be ordered; why the sanctions
Plaintiffs propose are impractical, unproductive, harmful, or beyond the
Court’s constitutional authority; and why, if the Court determines a
sanction should issue, any determination as to the proper sanction should
be deferred until after the 2015 legislative session. Plaintiffs’ answer
responded with policy arguments and rhetorical questions, but it did not
rebut those reasons with legal argument supported by pertinent authority.

1

Accordingly, this brief focuses primarily on whether the Court’s
exercise of its contempt power is the proper vehicle to promote progress
toward providing ample provision for basic education by 2018, concluding
with a rebuttal to Plaintiffs’ request for their preferred three-part order.1
II.
A.

ARGUMENT

The State Should Not Be Held in Contempt for the
Legislature’s Failure to Submit a “Complete Plan” to the
Court
The McCleary Plaintiffs (respondents in this appeal) argue that the

Court must hold the State in contempt in order to coerce ample funding.
Plaintiffs’ Answer at 36.

But the Order to Show Cause linked the

possibility of contempt only to the State’s failure to submit a complete
plan, not a prospective failure to fully implement its program of basic
education by 2018. Consequently, the relief sought by the Plaintiffs goes
well beyond any sanction reasonably designed to compel preparation of a
plan.
There is no doubt that the Court has power to enforce its orders.
But, as explained in the State’s opening brief, the January 2014 Order was
no run-of-the-mill court order, as in most contempt proceedings. Indeed,
Respondents have cited no contempt proceeding from any jurisdiction that

1

This brief also includes the State’s responses to the amicus briefs filed in this
case. The State will file no separate answer.
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involves a court order like the one at issue here.

Even the order in

Bresolin v. Morris, 86 Wn.2d 241, 543 P.2d 325 (1975), relied on by
Plaintiffs, pales in comparison. There, the Court considered holding the
Secretary of the Department of Social and Health Services in contempt for
failing to follow an order to make drug treatment available to an offender
in a correctional institution, but ended up continuing the request for
contempt pending the Department’s ongoing efforts to comply.
By contrast, the January 2014 Order directed the State to submit “a
complete plan for fully implementing its program of basic education for
each school year between now and the 2017-18 school year” that included
a phase-in schedule for fully funding each component of basic education.
McCleary v. State, No. 84362-7, Order at 8 (Jan. 9, 2014). That is a
complicated and difficult task.

The Legislature already had adopted

scheduled phase-in dates in statute. For example, transportation funding
was scheduled to be fully phased in by the 2013-15 biennium,
RCW 28A.160.192, and that deadline was met. State’s Reply at 7 (May
29, 2014). Funding for MSOCs (materials, supplies, and operating costs)
is scheduled to be fully phased in during the 2015-16 school year.
RCW 28A.150.260(8)(b).

Class size reductions are to be fully

implemented by 2017-18. RCW 28A.150.260(4)(b). But the Court sought
additional detail that would require the Legislature to decide how to

3

rebalance spending priorities and/or restructure revenue generation well
into the future. As explained in the State’s Opening Brief at 10-12, the
failure to arrive at a consensus on such a fundamental question should not
be considered willful disobedience by a co-equal branch, nor should it
give rise to contempt in this case.

It is appropriate for the Court to

maintain pressure on the Legislature to continue working toward
constitutional compliance; it is not appropriate for the Court to hold the
State in contempt because the Legislature did not pass a bill or resolution.
Moreover, holding the State in contempt for a failure to legislate is
a slippery slope.

Witness the argument in the amicus brief of the

Washington State Budget & Policy Center et al. at 1, that the State’s
“failure to adopt any new revenue measures constitutes contempt of this
Court’s order.” The failure to legislate new revenue measures does not
provide a basis for finding contempt of the Court’s order to submit a plan.
Respondents have cited no contempt case that involves a court
order analogous to the task assigned to the Legislature by this Court in
January. That Order called upon the Legislature to truncate a consensusbuilding process that properly is carried out over multiple years, as
described in the amicus brief submitted by the former Governors of

4

Washington,2 and by this Court in its decision. McCleary v. State, 173
Wn.2d. 477, 545, 269 P.3d 227 (2012).

Indeed, the range of public

interests highlighted in the several amicus briefs illustrates the enormity of
the task of creating a sustainable plan for funding and fully implementing
the reforms initiated by ESHB 2261 and SHB 27763 while maintaining
essential services to Washington residents.

Amicus brief of former

Governors at 15-17; Amicus brief of the Washington State Budget &
Policy Center et al. at 11-14; Amicus brief of Columbia Legal Services et
al. at 4-17. Although Plaintiffs casually dismiss every state program other
than basic education as “non-paramount,” the Legislature has a duty to the
public to consider how funding decisions will affect public health, safety,
and welfare, not to mention other legal duties imposed by the constitution,
the courts, and federal law.
In a very real way, the Court’s January 2014 Order accomplished
its purpose: it created urgency and dialogue in the Legislature, setting the
stage for the “next full opportunity to make meaningful progress”—i.e.,
the 2015 legislative session.4 The Plaintiffs’ simplistic test for finding

2

Amicus brief of former Governors Daniel J. Evans, John Spellman, Mike
Lowry, Gary Locke, and Christine Gregoire at 10-14.
3

Laws of 2009, ch. 548, and Laws of 2010, ch. 236, respectively.

4

Amicus brief of former Governors at 6. See also Report to the Washington
State Supreme Court by the Joint Select Committee on Article IX Litigation (Apr. 30,
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contempt—whether the Legislature knowingly adjourned at the end of the
60-day session in 2014—does not do justice to the circumstances here.
First, the Legislature is required by law to adjourn after 60 days. Const.
art. II, § 12. Second, Plaintiffs assume, without any evidence, that more
progress toward the 2018 deadline would have been accomplished in a
special session than by planning for the forthcoming budget session.5 The
true measure of the State’s progress will be the actions the Legislature
takes in the 2015 session.
Even if the Court could find contempt, it need not do so to hold the
State accountable for implementing the remedy ordered in the McCleary
decision. As explained below, the Court already has adequate remedial
tools to address laws that violate the Constitution.
B.

If the Court Finds the State in Contempt for Failing to Provide
a “Complete Plan,” It Should Not Order Any Sanction to
Compel a Plan
1.

Formulating a Remedy in a Positive Rights Case Tests
the Limits of Judicial Power and Restraint

The Court explained that the duty placed on the State to amply
fund basic education creates a corresponding “positive right” held by

2014) (Leg. 2014 Report) at 32-33 (explaining the enhanced prospect of achieving
consensus in the 2015 Legislature and acknowledging the need to do so).
5

Plaintiffs fail to acknowledge the substantial preparatory effort for each
legislative session accomplished by legislators and their staff outside the legislative
chambers.
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schoolchildren, which is distinct from other “rights” such as the freedom
of religion or freedom of speech, which are framed as negative restrictions
on government action. McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 518-19. Where a court
finds that government is violating a right framed as a negative restriction,
the appropriate response of the court is to order government to stop the
violation. But this Court carefully explained that this approach “provides
the wrong lens for analyzing positive constitutional rights.” McCleary,
173 Wn.2d at 519.

The question is not whether government has

overstepped its constitutional bounds such that it must be ordered to cease
the offending conduct; the proper question is whether the government’s
action “achieves or is reasonably likely to achieve ‘the constitutionally
prescribed end.’ ” Id. (quoting Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State
Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112 Harv. L.
Rev. 1131, 1137 (1999)).
Plaintiffs mischaracterize this Court’s orders and the actions of the
2014 Legislature, and, because they have failed to acknowledge the
distinction between positive rights and negative restrictions on
government action, they misunderstand the options available to the Court.6

6

See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Answer at 3 (characterizing the Court as having ordered
the State to “cease its violation” of children’s positive right to an amply funded basic
education by 2018 and exhorting the Court to “stop[ ] the State’s violation” of the right to
an amply funded basic education); id. at 9-10 (arguing that the Court has power to “bring

7

As a consequence, they disregard the Court’s careful recognition that this
case involves a “delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation” that
“test[s] the limits of judicial restraint and discretion.” Id. at 519 (quoting
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 90 Wn.2d 476, 497, 585 P.2d 71 (1978)).
There is no government action to “bring to a halt.” The appropriate
remedy is one that results in the enactment of legislation that “achieves or
is reasonably likely to achieve ‘the constitutionally prescribed end’ ” by
2018. McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 519.
2.

Sanctioning the State to Force Compliance With the
January 2014 Order Would not Increase the Likelihood
of Achieving Compliance With Article IX, Section 1 by
2018

In its January 2012 decision, the Court stated that its purpose in
retaining jurisdiction was to foster a dialogue with the Legislature that
would further the shared goal of providing ample funding for educational
reforms by 2018. The January 2014 Order reiterated the Court’s desire to
“foster dialogue and cooperation in reaching a goal shared by all
Washingtonians.” January 2014 Order at 8. The State suggests that the
order to submit a “complete plan” should be viewed as part of that
dialogue, intended to further the ultimate goal of constitutional
compliance.
a halt” to the constitutional violation at issue); id. at 13 (arguing that the Court has power
to “stop” the State from violating the constitutional right of schoolchildren).

8

Preferring confrontation to dialogue, Plaintiffs urge the Court to
require a special legislative session to produce a plan by December 31,
2014, under the threat of a strong coercive sanction to follow.7 Plaintiffs’
Answer at 24-28. As explained in the State’s Opening Brief at 13, a plan
adopted by the 63rd Legislature would not bind the 64th Legislature. 8
Compelling the 63rd Legislature to convene a special session to adopt a
nonbinding plan would place form over substance, and impede, not
facilitate, legislative progress toward the real goal:

legislative

development and enactment of strategies that amply fund basic education
by 2018. Amicus brief of former Governors at 5, 10.
Plaintiffs dismiss the concern that a finding of contempt followed
by sanctions runs the real risk of poisoning the Court’s dialogue with the
Legislature, or at minimum distracting the focus of both the Legislature
and the Court from the ultimate goal. In part, this risk is present because
the Legislature is the only entity with constitutional authority to take the
actions required by the Court’s January 2014 Order to the State. And the

7

The Legislature may call itself into special session or may convene, if it
chooses, in response to a proclamation by the Governor. Const. art. II, § 12(2), art. III,
§ 7. But no provision of the Washington Constitution authorizes the Court to order a
special session of the Legislature.
8

As explained both in the Leg. 2014 Report at 34-38, and in the amicus brief of
the former Governors at 10-11, the Legislature operates on a biennial budget-writing
cycle and is not institutionally equipped to make long-term revenue and funding plans
during the non-budget-writing sessions. Because of that institutional constraint, it may
have been unrealistic to expect a complete plan by April 30.

9

Legislature is not a normal party in civil litigation, like a private
corporation or partnership (Plaintiffs’ Answer at 19); it is a coequal branch
in a government of constitutionally divided powers, and it possesses some
powers that are beyond the Court’s authority to command, as summarized
below. A finding of contempt and the imposition of coercive sanctions
may satisfy Plaintiffs, but it will not promote progress toward ample
provision for basic education.
3.

The Court’s Power to Sanction for Contempt Is Subject
to Constitutional Limits

Plaintiffs nevertheless take the position that if the Court finds the
State in contempt, it is then free to take virtually any action that could
coerce legislative compliance, including commandeering legislative power
to force full constitutional compliance by the 2015 Legislature. In doing
so, they lose sight of two important limitations.
a.

A Sanction Must Address the Act Leading to a
Finding of Contempt

The first limitation is the subject matter of this contempt
proceeding. It was a failure to produce a plan that led to the possibility of
contempt, and thus the purpose of any remedial sanction should be to
coerce submission of a plan. See King v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs.,
110 Wn.2d 793, 800, 756 P.2d 1303 (1988). But Plaintiffs continue to
advocate much broader sanctions, as if the State has failed to meet the

10

2018 deadline this Court adopted. In its original decision, however, the
Court recognized the difficulty of the task ahead and gave the State six
years to develop and implement a constitutional system of funding basic
education. McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 545-47. We are not yet halfway to
that deadline, and Plaintiffs’ request for sanctions to compel compliance
with that deadline is premature. The appropriate focus for a sanction, if
there were to be one, is the Court’s January 2014 Order to submit a plan.
b.

A Sanction Must Not Exceed Constitutional
Limits of the Court’s Power

The second limitation is constitutional. Plaintiffs appear to believe
that the Court is not bound by any constitutional limitation in crafting a
sanction if it first finds the State in contempt. But the Court’s power to
enforce its orders is not unbounded. The Court’s exercise of its power still
must be guided by separation of powers limitations and by other
constitutional limitations and principles.
Separation of Powers.

As detailed in our prior briefing, the

doctrine of separation of powers stands as a constitutional bar against one
branch of government invading or undermining powers that are
constitutionally delegated to another branch. Brown v. Owen, 165 Wn.2d
706, 718-19, 206 P.3d 310 (2009).

In the context of this case, the

constitutional concern is that a sanction may invade or effectively assume
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control of the taxing and/or appropriation powers reserved by our
constitution to the Legislature.
Article VIII, section 4 of the Washington Constitution places the
authority for appropriation of funds exclusively in the Legislature. “Long
ago, we recognized the central object of section 4 was to secure to the
legislative department of the government the exclusive power of deciding
how, when, and for what purposes the public funds shall be applied in
carrying on the government.” Washington Ass’n of Neighborhood Stores
v. State, 149 Wn.2d 359, 365, 70 P.3d 920 (2003) (quoting State v.
Clausen, 94 Wash. 166, 173, 162 P. 1 (1917) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
The Court has recognized there may be “special situations” where
it may have authority to order the expenditure of state funds. See Hillis v.
Dep’t of Ecology, 131 Wn.2d 373, 390, 932 P.2d 139 (1997) (citing In re
Juvenile Director, 87 Wn.2d 232, 242, 552 P.2d 163 (1976) (judiciary has
the inherent power to compel funding of its own functions); see also City
of Ellensburg v. State, 118 Wn.2d 709, 717-18, 826 P.2d 1081 (1992)
(citing Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 90 Wn.2d 476, as an example of a “rare
case” in which the judiciary may interfere with the Legislature’s
constitutional power of appropriation.). But separation of power concerns
are implicated any time the judiciary seeks to exert control over

12

appropriations, and this Court has never held that those concerns disappear
in the “rare case” in which there is a competing constitutional mandate.9
In like manner, article VII, section 5 of the Washington
Constitution vests the State’s authority to impose taxes solely in the
Legislature. See Larson v. Seattle Popular Monorail Auth., 156 Wn.2d
752, 770, 131 P.3d 892 (2006) (“It is elementary that the power of
taxation, subject to constitutional limitations, rests solely in the
legislature.”) (quoting State ex rel. Tacoma Sch. Dist. v. Kelly, 176 Wash.
689, 690, 30 P.2d 638 (1934)); Ban-Mac, Inc. v. King County, 69 Wn.2d
49, 51, 416 P.2d 694 (1966) (“[Article VII] places revenue and taxation
matters under legislative control. We may construe but not legislate in tax
matters.”); Gruen v. State Tax Comm’n, 35 Wn.2d 1, 64, 211 P.2d 651
(1949) (“[T]he state’s fiscal policy has been by the constitution delegated
to the legislature and not to this court.”). While the Court may direct the
Legislature to exercise its power of taxation to fund a program that is
constitutionally mandated, Pannell v. Thompson, 91 Wn.2d 591, 599, 589
P.2d 1235 (1979), the Court may not itself assume that power. See BanMac, Inc., 69 Wn.2d at 51 (“We may construe but not legislate in tax

9

Ironically, in Juvenile Director, the Court relied on separation of powers—the
need to protect the judicial branch from improper checks by the legislative branch—as
the constitutional justification for judicial incursion into the legislative function. 87
Wn.2d at 244-45.
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matters.”); State ex rel. Hart v. Gleeson, 189 Wash. 292, 295-96, 64 P.2d
1023 (1937) (Court cannot legislate to remedy the Legislature’s failure or
refusal to delegate additional taxing power to counties). If the Legislature
falters, the constitutional remedy is to invalidate the effort and direct the
Legislature to try again; it is not for the Court to step into the Legislature’s
shoes.
Legislative Immunity. Any sanction that would have the effect of
imposing liability on legislators because they did or did not vote in a
certain way would violate the state constitution’s speech and debate clause
in article II, section 17. See State of Washington’s Reply at 16 (May 29,
2014).

Moreover, any such sanction would be inappropriate because

Plaintiffs sued the State of Washington, not any individual legislator. For
the State to respond to the Court’s Order, it is the Legislature that must
enact legislation, and it can do so only collectively. Const. art. II, sec. 22.
4.

The Court’s Power to Sanction for Contempt Is Subject
to Practical Limits

As explained above, the Court lacks constitutional power to
assume the Legislature’s taxing and spending functions.

The Court’s

constitutional role is to determine the constitutionality of legislation after

14

it is enacted, not in anticipation of enactment.10 It is not the Court’s
constitutional role to direct the content of legislation.11
Plaintiffs nevertheless have proposed various remedies in which
the Court would order additional spending on K-12 education or prohibit
expenditures for “non-paramount” purposes unless and until K-12
education is fully funded.

Plaintiffs’ Answer at 31-38.

Amici have

proposed additional remedies, in which the Court would compel tax
increases12 or adopt a sort of judicial line-item veto.13
To the extent these remedies are framed as options for the
Legislature to choose from in exercising its constitutional taxing and
appropriations powers to achieve the constitutional compliance the Court
ordered in its 2012 decision, the remedies may be constitutionally
permissible. But to the extent they contemplate the Court making the
specific determinations regarding new taxes, spending cuts to other
programs, or which “non-paramount” programs are essential or

10

State ex rel. O’Connell v. Kramer, 73 Wn.2d 85, 87, 436 P.2d 786 (1968)
(“[W]e cannot pass on the constitutionality of proposed legislation . . . until the
legislative process is complete and the bill or measure has been enacted into law.”).
11

Washington State Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Gregoire, 162 Wn.2d 284, 307, 174
P.3d 1142 (2007) (“It is neither the prerogative nor the function of this court to substitute
our judgment for that of the legislature in enacting laws unless those laws clearly
contravene state or federal constitutional provisions.”).
12

Amicus brief of Washington State Budget & Policy Center et al. at 16-19.

13

Amicus brief of Superintendent of Public Instruction at 5-12.
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expendable, they require the Court to assume a legislative function for
which it is not equipped.
The Court should not use contempt as a vehicle for fashioning a
remedy requiring reform of the existing state revenue system, as the
Washington State Budget & Policy Center advocates,14 or undertaking to
take control of legislative decisionmaking, as Plaintiffs advocate,15 or
establishing a judicial process for vetoing spending decisions, as the
Superintendent of Public Instruction advocates.16 There is no need to do
so, because the Court’s traditional power to address unconstitutional
legislative action is adequate and more appropriate. The Court possesses
unquestioned constitutional authority to invalidate challenged legislation
that violates the Washington Constitution. What it lacks is constitutional
authority to legislate or to mandate the content of specific legislation.
C.

No Sanction Should Be Ordered, if at All, Until the 2015
Legislature Is Given an Opportunity to Act
Plaintiffs ask for aggressive enforcement action now to force

compliance with article IX, section 1. Only such action, they argue, will
demonstrate to schoolchildren that their rights under article IX, section 1
matter. Plaintiffs’ Answer at 52.
14

Amicus brief of Washington State Budget & Policy Center et al. at 16-19.

15

Plaintiffs’ Answer at 31-41.

16

Amicus brief of Superintendent of Public Instruction at 5-12.
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The proper lesson for schoolchildren is that the entire constitution
matters. The distribution of government power among separate branches
matters. The integrity of the legislative process matters. Their rights are
protected not just by article IX, section 1, but by their government’s
respect for and adherence to all provisions of the constitution.
The means of achieving compliance with article IX, section 1
matter every bit as much as the compliance itself. The constitutional
mandate to amply fund basic education does not exist in a constitutional
vacuum and provides no justification for disregarding any other provision
of the constitution. It provides no constitutional basis for the judiciary to
invade or arrogate the legislative function constitutionally delegated
exclusively to the legislative branch.
We previously explained why no sanction should be imposed
before the 2015 legislative session. State’s Opening Brief at 30; see also
amicus brief of former Governors at 1-2. The Court adopted a 2018
deadline for full compliance with article IX, section 1, and it will have a
full opportunity to enforce that deadline at that time, through the use of
traditional remedies for responding to unconstitutional legislation.

It

should continue to give the Legislature the opportunity to meet that
deadline.

17

There is an additional reason the Court should allow the 2015
Legislature to act, rather than dictating specific solutions now. Although
this case involves retained jurisdiction, at its core it is an adversary
proceeding, which is not an appropriate forum to decide overarching
questions of state policy. The information a court receives in an adversary
proceeding is dominated by the parties, often to the exclusion of the wider
universe of information possessed by the public.
When deciding a dispute between adversaries, those evidentiary
limitations are efficient and effective, but not when deciding public policy,
as this case illustrates. The State’s paramount duty is not its sole duty.
Plaintiffs focus solely on obtaining more money for education. Their
single-minded focus suggests a willingness to risk real harm to
Washington residents to achieve that goal. There is no doubt that ample
provision for basic education is the State’s paramount duty under the
constitution. But the health, safety, and welfare of residents also are
vitally important, yet Plaintiffs dismiss them as “constitutionally
irrelevant.” Plaintiffs’ Answer at 30.
Amici address some of the harms at issue if the Court were to
mandate increased education spending without consideration of other
public interests. See Amicus brief of former Governors at 15-18; Amicus
brief of Columbia Legal Services et al. at 4-17; Amicus of Washington

18

State Budget & Policy Center et al. at 11-12. Plaintiffs would sacrifice
these interests, many of which provide critical support for children.17
Balancing these interests for the residents of Washington is the
Legislature’s responsibility, not Plaintiffs—and not the Court’s, in the
context of one lawsuit.
The Court should not get distracted by “the procedural trees rather
than the constitutional forest.” Amicus brief of former Governors at 6.
Rather than dwell on the Legislature’s failure to submit a plan, the Court
should restore the focus of this case to the shared goal of determining how
to provide the best educational opportunities to all of Washington’s
children. Id. at 1. Plaintiffs’ proposed remedies will not further that goal.
D.

Plaintiffs’ Proposed Three-Part Remedy Will Not Promote
Progress Toward Constitutional Compliance
The Plaintiffs propose a three-part enforcement order that makes

little sense. First, they ask the Court to hold the State in contempt until it
complies with the Court’s various orders. Plaintiffs’ Answer at 6, 25, 53.
The request rests on a faulty foundation.

17

On its face, the request is

See Plaintiffs’ Answer at 29-30 (characterizing all other spending as merely
“non-paramount things State officials want to fund”) (Plaintiffs’ emphasis omitted); id. at
33 (“[T]he merit of any particular non-education program is not the question here. The
question is whether prohibiting (or limiting) State expenditures on any particular noneducation program until the legislature complies with this Court’s Order can coerce
compliance with that Order.”) (Plaintiffs’ emphasis omitted); id. at 38 (“[T]he State’s
invocation of possible funding impacts on other State programs is constitutionally
irrelevant in this case.”).

19

overbroad insofar as it links compliance to anything other than submission
of a plan to the Court, because Plaintiffs candidly admit they view
contempt as a means to coerce the compliance due in 2018. Plaintiffs’
Answer at 36. Plaintiffs in essence ask the Court to hold the State in
contempt until full compliance is achieved.

But, as the State has

repeatedly pointed out in this brief and in its opening brief, the Court’s
Order to Show Cause is based solely on the failure to submit a “complete
plan”—not a failure to fully achieve the 2018 implementation goal. The
Court should not hold the State in contempt for failing to achieve full
compliance before 2018.
Second, Plaintiffs propose enjoining the imposition of “any more”
unfunded or underfunded mandates on schools. Plaintiffs’ Answer at 7,
25-27, 53. They supply no nexus between an “unfunded/underfunded
mandates” injunction and the issue giving rise to the show cause order,
i.e., the failure to submit a plan. Rather, this part of their three-part
proposal is premature. It is an alternative remedy for an ultimate failure to
implement finance reforms necessary to cure the constitutional violation.
An injunction “must be tailored to remedy the specific harms
shown rather than to enjoin all possible breaches of the law.” Kitsap
County v. Kev, Inc., 106 Wn.2d 135, 143, 720 P.2d 818 (1986). Plaintiffs
do not dispute the legal standard. They argue that the specific harm is

20

“further digging the unconstitutional funding hole.” Plaintiffs’ Answer at
27.

Their argument incorrectly presupposes that facts have been

established regarding specific unfunded or underfunded mandates and that
specific mandates have been identified by the Court, when in fact the
Plaintiffs can cite only to their own assertions.

See, e.g., Plaintiffs’

Answer at 25 (citing their own prior briefing).
Plaintiffs also simplistically argue that everyone knows an
unfunded (and presumably, underfunded) mandate when they see it.
Plaintiffs’ Answer at 26-27. But Plaintiffs surely understand that such a
broad injunction would be an invitation for additional litigation over
whether any particular piece of education policy legislation implicates a
state funding obligation and, if so, what the funding level should be.
Additional sub-litigation during the period that the State is phasing in its
finance remedies is unlikely to be helpful in achieving constitutional
compliance.

This Court recognized as much in setting the stage for

retaining jurisdiction in this case. McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 544 (“Too
much deference may set the stage for another major lawsuit challenging
the legislature’s failure to adhere to its own implementation schedule.”).
The final part of Plaintiffs’ proposed three-part remedy asks for
“strong judicial enforcement orders” in January 2015 if the 63rd
Legislature does not submit a plan by December 2014. Plaintiffs’ Answer
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at 7, 27-28, 53. Presumably the “strong judicial enforcement orders”
refers to the sanctions they previously proposed. They don’t say.
The Court should reject Plaintiffs’ desire to squeeze more out of
the 63rd Legislature. They have failed to make any credible case for why
the 63rd Legislature should be forced to act to prepare a plan that cannot
bind the 64th Legislature mere weeks before the new Legislature convenes
with newly-elected members. It smacks of punishment. Instead, there are
sound prudential reasons for the Court not to consider such an order.18
Just as judicial preparation may take place outside of the courtroom or
even outside of chambers, legislative preparation may occur outside of the
Legislative Building.19 All branches of the State should be focused on
facilitating an environment most calculated to yield progress in 2015.
That includes sustained judicial vigilance. But the incoming Legislature

18

For example, the voters will be considering a new set of education funding
requirements in Initiative 1351 in November. According to the Fiscal Impact Statement
(https://wei.sos.wa.gov/agency/osos/en/press_and_research/PreviousElections/2014/Gene
ral-Election/Pages/Online-Voters-Guide.aspx), that initiative could impose a new
statutory funding requirement of $4.7 billion through 2019 without any provision for
increasing state revenues. Should I-1351 be adopted, any plan adopted by the 2014
Legislature would be incomplete or worthless for use by the 2015 Legislature. If it fails
at the polls, legislators and pundits will mine its failure for its political significance. This
example illustrates the uncertain political landscape continuing to year’s end and the folly
of Plaintiffs’ demand for a plan of the eve of the new Legislature taking office.
19

See Amicus brief of former Governors at 12-13 (discussing their experience
with the deliberative legislative process); Amicus brief of Washington State Budget &
Policy Center et al. at 11-12 (discussing preparations by the Governor’s Office).
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also must have time between the fall elections and the start of the 2015
session to prepare for progress.
We have argued that no sanctions should be considered before the
end of the 2015 session, if at all. Nonetheless, if the Court is inclined to
issue some type of “strong judicial enforcement order” between now and
the end of the 2015 legislative session, the Court should not wait until
January 2015. An order on the eve of the legislative session will not
promote progress toward constitutional compliance. We have argued that
the Court can craft a more effective and appropriate remedy, if one is
necessary, at the conclusion of the 2015 legislative session once its
success or shortcoming can be assessed. But if the Court determines after
this show cause proceeding that it should identify a particular remedy if
the 2015 Legislature fall short of expectations, the State should be
informed now of that remedy, so it can be taken into consideration in
planning for the 2015 legislative session.
III.

CONCLUSION

The Court should not find the State in contempt and should impose
no sanction on the State for its failure to submit the plan specified in the
Court’s January 2014 Order. If the Court determines a sanction should be
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